Friday, July 25, 2008

Time to take it out !!

# for num in $(seq -w 200); do ssh n$num free -tm | grep Mem | awk '{print $2}';
done | sort | uniq



Just joshin..phun intended.. !
   

Tuesday, July 22, 2008

BEST READ Evah !! The cat[DNS] is indeed out of the bag [INTERNET]


HERES how it Works..minor edits to make it readable.

NOTE :  I REALLY DON'T KNOW THE AUTHOR OF THIS FAB READ. THAT THE WAY IT HAPPENS  IN THIS ZONE ..SO FAR ALL I KNOW  ITS --YES, Halvar Flake


Backgrounder

Pretend for the moment that you know only the basic function of DNS — that it translates WWW.VICTIM.COM into 1.2.3.4. The code that does this is called a resolver. Each time the resolver contacts the DNS to translate names to addresses, it creates a packet called a  query. The exchange of packets is called a transaction. Since the number of packets flying about on the internet requires scientific notation to express, you can imagine there has to be some way of not mixing them up.

Bob goes to to a deli, to get a sandwich. Bob walks up to the counter, takes a pointy ticket from a round red dispenser. The
ticket has a number on it. This will be Bob's unique identifier for his sandwich acquisition transaction. Note that the number will
probably be used twice — once when he is called to the counter to place his order and again when he's called back to get his sandwich. If you're wondering, Bob likes ham on rye with no onions.

If you've got this, you have the concept of transaction IDs, which are numbers assigned to keep different transactions in order. Conveniently, the first sixteen bits of a DNS packet is just such a unique identifier. It's called a query id (QID). And with the efficiency of the deli, the QID is used for multiple transactions.


VEXT0R's and HEX's

Until very recently, there were two basic classes of DNS vulnerabilities. One of them involves mucking about with the QID in
DNS packets and the other requires you to know the Deep Magic.  First, QIDs. Bob's a resolver and Alice is a content DNS server. Bob asks Alice for the address of WWW.VICTIM.COM. The answer is 1.2.3.4. Mallory would like the answer to be 6.6.6.0.

It is a (now not) secret shame of mine that for a great deal of my career, creating and sending packets was, to me, Deep Magic. Then it became part of my job, and I learned that it is surprisingly trivial. So put aside the idea that forging IP packets is the hard part of poisoning DNS. If I'm Mallory and I'm attacking Bob, how can he distinguish my packets from Alice's? Because I can't see the QID in his request, and the QID in my response won't match. The QID is the only thing protecting the DNS from Mallory (me).

QID attacks began in the olden days, when BIND simply incremented the QID with every query response. If you can remember 1995, here's a workable DNS attack. Think fast: 9372 + 1. Did you get 9372, or even miss and get 9373? You win, Alice loses. Mallory sends a constant stream of DNS responses for WWW.VICTIM.COM. All are quietly discarded —- until Mallory gets Bob to query for WWW.VICTIM.COM. If Mallory's response gets to your computer before the legitimate response arrives from your ISP's name server, you will be redirected where Mallory tells you you're going.

Obvious fix: you want the QID be randomly generated. Now Alice and Mallory are in a race. Alice sees Bob's request and knows the QID. Mallory has to guess it. The first one to land a packet with the correct QID wins. Randomized QIDs give Alice a big advantage in this race.  But there's a bunch more problems here:

  1.   If you convince Bob to ask Alice the same question 1000 times all at once, and Bob uses a different QID for each packet, you madethe race 1000 times easier for Mallory to win.
  2.   If Bob uses a crappy random number generator, Mallory can get Bob to ask for names she controls, like WWW.EVIL.COM, and watch how the QIDs bounce around; eventually, she'll break the RNG and be able to predict its outputs.

16 bits just isn't big enough to provide real security at the traffic rates we deal with in 2008.

Your computer's resolver is probably a stub. Which means it won't really save the response. You don't want it to. The stub asks a real DNS server, probably run by your ISP. That server doesn't know everything. It can't, and shouldn't, because the whole idea of DNS is to compensate for the organic and shifting nature of internet naming and addressing. Frequently, that server has to go ask another, and so on. The cool kids call this "recursion". 

Responses carry another value, too, called a time to live (TTL).  This number tells your name server how long to cache the answer.  Why? Because they deal with zillions of queries. Whoever wins the  race between Alice and Mallory, their answer gets cached. All subsequent responses will be dropped. All future requests for that same data, within the TTL, come from that answer. This is good for whoever wins the race. If Alice wins, it means Mallory can't poison the cache for that name. If Mallory wins, the next 10,000 or so people that ask that cache where WWW.VICTIM.COM is go to 6.6.6.0.

YET ANOTHER VEXT0R !!

Then there's that other set of DNS vulnerabilities. These require you to pay attention in class. They haven't really been talked about since 1997. And they're hard to find, because you have to understand how DNS works. In other words, you have to be completely crazy. Lazlo Hollyfeld crazy. I'm speaking of course of RRset poisoning.

DNS has a complicated architecture. Not only that, but not all name servers run the same code. So not all of them implement DNS in exactly the same way. And not only that, but not all name servers are configured properly.

I just described a QID attack that poisons the name server's cache. This attack requires speed, agility and luck, because if the "real" answer happens to arrive before your spoofed one, you're locked out. Fortunately for those of you that have a time machine, some versions of DNS provide you with another way to poison the name server's cache anyway. To explain it, I will have to explain more about the format of a DNS packet.

DNS packets are variable in length and consist of a header, some flags and resource records (RRs). RRs are where the goods ride around. There are up to three sets of RRs in a DNS packet, along with the original query. These are:

  1. Answer RR's, which contain the answer to whatever question you asked (such as the A record that says WWW.VICTIM.COM is 1.2.3.4)
  2. Authority RR's, which tell resolvers which name servers to refer to to get the complete answer for a question
  3. Additional RR's, sometimes called "glue", which contain any additional information needed to make the response effective.

A word about the Additional RR's. Think about an NS record, like the one that COM's name server uses to tell us that, to find out where WWW.VICTIM.COM is, you have to ask NS1.VICTIM.COM. That's good to know, but it's not going to help you unless you know where to find NS1.VICTIM.COM. Names are not addresses. This is a chicken and egg problem. The answer is, you provide both the NS record pointing VICTIM.COM to NS1.VICTIM.COM, and the A record pointing NS1.VICTIM.COM to 1.2.3.1.

Now, let's party like it's 1995.

Download the source code for a DNS implementation and hack it up such that every time it sends out a response, it also sends out a little bit of evil — an extra Additional RR with bad information. Then let's set up an evil server with it, and register it as EVIL.COM. Now get a bunch of web pages up with IMG tags pointing to names hosted at that server.

Bob innocently loads up a page with the malicious tags which coerces his browser resolve that name. Bob asks Alice to resolve that name. Here comes recursion: eventually the query arrives at our evil server. Which sends back a response with an unexpected (evil) Additional RR.

If Alice's cache honors the unexpected record, it's 1995 —- buy  CSCO! —- and you just poisoned their cache. Worse, it will replace the "real" data already in the cache with the fake data. You asked where WWW.EVIL.COM was (or rather, the image tags did). But Alice also "found out" where WWW.VICTIM.COM was: 6.6.6.0. Every resolver that points to that name server will now gladly forward you to the website of the beast.

FIXES and PATCHES TILL @008 .

It's not 1995. It's 2008. There are fixes for the attacks I have described.

Fix 1:  The QID race is fixed with random IDs, and by using a strong random number generator and being careful with the state you keep for queries. 16 bit query IDs are still too short, which fills us with dread. There are hacks to get around this. For instance, DJBDNS randomizes the source port on requests as well, and thus won't honor responses unless they come from someone who guesses the ~16bit source port. This brings us close to 32 bits, which is much harder to guess.

Fix 2:  The RR set poisoning attack is fixed by bailiwick checking, which   is a quirky way of saying that resolvers simply remember that if they're asking where WWW.VICTIM.COM is, they're not interested in caching a new address for WWW.GOOGLE.COM in the same transaction.

Remember how these fixes work. They're very important.

PRESENT DAY.

Let's try again to convince Bob that WWW.VICTIM.COM is 6.6.6.0.

This time though, instead of getting Bob to look up WWW.VICTIM.COM  and then beating Alice in the race, or getting Bob to look up WWW.EVIL.COM and slipping strychnine into his ham sandwich, we'regoing to be clever (sneaky).

Get Bob to look up AAAAA.VICTIM.COM. Race Alice. Alice's answer is NXDOMAIN, because there's no such name as AAAAA.VICTIM.COM. Mallory has an answer. We'll come back to it. Alice has an advantage in the race, and so she likely beats Mallory. NXDOMAIN for AAAAA.VICTIM.COM.

Alice's advantage is not insurmountable. Mallory repeats with  AAAAB.VICTIM.COM. Then AAAAC.VICTIM.COM. And so on. Sometime, perhaps around CXOPQ.VICTIM.COM, Mallory wins! Bob believes CXOPQ.VICTIM.COM is 6.6.6.0!

Poisoning CXOPQ.VICTIM.COM is not super valuable to Mallory. But Mallory has another trick up her sleeve. Because her response didn't just say CXOPQ.VICTIM.COM was 6.6.6.0. It also contained Additional RRs pointing WWW.VICTIM.COM to 6.6.6.0. Those records are in-bailiwick: Bob is in fact interested in VICTIM.COM for this query. Mallory has combined attack #1 with attack #2, defeating fix #1 and fix #2. Mallory can conduct this attack in less than 10 seconds on a fast Internet link.

Saturday, July 19, 2008

Xbox vs Apple TV.

Had to capture this. Why ? the simplicty of the question and the answers open a whole dimension of thoughts , pros & cons etc. It goes like this..

"why does it take like an hour to get a rental on xbox live while apple tv can get it already right away?" -  MG Siegler
One is an Apple product, one is a Microsoft product. Any questions? - Louis Gray


Thursday, July 17, 2008

Yahoo Agrees to SELL -at $33

"Just got the alert via Marc Hustvedt, co-founder of Tubefilter, on Twitter linking to a Search Engine Journal story reporting that Jerry Yang sent an e-mail out to shareholders that Yahoo is willing to sell to Microsoft at the price of $33 per share"

Source

Wednesday, July 16, 2008

Congratulations to our Millionth Terrorist!

Good Catch by Schnier ...
 

The U.S terrorist watch list has hit one million names. I sure hope we're giving our millionth terrorist a prize of some sort.

Who knew that a million people are terrorists. Why, there are only twice as many burglars in the U.S. And fifteen times more terrorists than arsonists.

Is this idiotic, or what?

Saturday, July 12, 2008

hi there! - We love u !!

Berry Berry Cute !!

All the way from Holland , my Cousins daughter "Little Hobbit" and sends me a pic of her & little brother.

"I was babysitting and we (kees and I) had nothing to do... ;)"

Luv u back ..Cousins :)-

Monday, July 07, 2008

Trust me, I won't be around always, so sharing this today !!

Trust me, I wont be around always, so this is the best time to share this !!

Hope you enjoy.. its awwsssssssssome !

Saturday, July 05, 2008

EXTREME DATA SET !! => Fwd: [Full-disclosure] Mrfetch Paul Carnes YouTube

Not sure what this is !!

Brief : Its quite a data set for profile Analysis. Renderation needs to be confirmed.
Point: Perp has taken time to white out SSN  = >"Social Security Number: 369-94-XXXX"
MyTake: Legit data set

/pd

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Sock Puppet <socketpuppetsftw@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, Jul 5, 2008 at 7:19 PM
Subject: [Full-disclosure] Mrfetch Paul Carnes YouTube
To: full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk


Mrfetch (Paul Carnes) is a homosexual that believes the internet is his personal army. In a video online, MrFetch attempts to rally the "you-tubers" together and fight the Anonymous Internet. While completely impossible, Mr Fetch vlogs as if everything on the internets were "serious business". Even while stating the phrase "stand down" eleven times and claiming anon is burning down trailers, he still persisting that he is "just getting started, baby." He is spreading lies about anon, as flattering as they are, this can not continue to happen.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fa_lfg1DhDc

Paul A. Carnes  
Self-Declared Leader of "Anonymous"
screen name " Mrfetch "
Cell: (334) 663-4656
ADDRESS:
927 Honeysuckle Rd
Dothan  Alabama 36305


Relatives:

Jo Ann Carnes
927 Honeysuckle Rd
Dothan, AL 36305-1916
334-673-4656

Gayle Carnes
104 CONCORD CIR 
DOTHAN, AL 36301
(334) 702-2041

Robert M Carnes
900 OVERLOOK DR 
DOTHAN, AL 36303
(334) 793-1330

Susan Carnes
115 MONTROSE CT 
DOTHAN, AL 36305
(334) 702-8867

Name: KARNES, PAUL A Also Known As: CARNES, PAUL Social Security Number: 369-94-XXXX Address: 927 HONEYSUCKLE RD DOTHAN, AL 36305-1916 Address Updated: 11/15/2004 Previous Addresses: 517 COVEY CIR DOTHAN, AL 36305-7171 Address Updated: 10/1/2000 Telephone: (334) 663-4656 On File Since: 10/1/2000

ALABAMA MOTOR VEHICLE REGISTRATION Owner Name: NATIONWIDE - COMPANY Owner Mailing Address: 4100 COLONNADE PKWY STE 150 BIRMINGHAM, AL 35243-3372 County: JEFFERSON Registrant: CARNES, PAUL A. - INDIVIDUAL Registrant Mailing Address: 12458 PAUL DUNCAN RD COTTONDALE, AL 35453-3512 County: TUSCALOOSA Co-Owner 1: SADISCO OF BIRMINGHAM - COMPANY PO BOX 101055 BIRMINGHAM, AL 35210-6055 County: JEFFERSON

TITLE INFORMATION ******

Original Title Date: 9/4/1997 Title Transfer Date: 9/4/1997

REGISTRATION INFORMATION ******

Original Registration Date: 3/17/1997 Registration Date: 3/17/1997 Expiration Date: 2/28/1998

PLATE INFORMATION ****

Plate Number: 63BY204 Plate State: ALABAMA Plate Type: PRIVATE Vehicle's Previous Plate Number: 63APS45 Vehicle's Previous Plate State: ALABAMA

VEHICLE INFORMATION ***

Vehicle Class Description: PASSENGER CAR/LIGHT TRUCK VIN: 1FAPP959XKW179630 Model Year: 1989 Manufacturer: FORD Model: ESCORT 4D Vehicle Series: LX Color: UNKNOWN Vehicle Weight: 2371 LBS. Search Results: 4 records found in our database

Other Information:

Status: Single Orientation: Gay Age: 23 Zodiac Sign: Aries (Mar 21 - Apr 19) Ethnicity: Latino / White Hispanic  Religion: Christian Baptist - other Children: Someday Education: In college Occupation: HaterAlert.com

paulcarnes.com has address 64.202.189.170 paulfetch.com has address 68.178.232.100 hateralert.com has address 68.178.232.100

Emails: mrpaulcarnes@yahoo.com mrpaulcarnes@aol.com playboikid85@yahoo.com 


History:
Chipola College Theater  
Wedding Planner
Scientology Enthusiast 
Baptist 
Gay Homosexual Male


Resources:

http://www.youtube.com/user/mrfetch
http://www.youtube.com/profile?user=PaulFetch
http://www.encyclopediadramatica.com/Mrfetch
http://partyvan.info/index.php/Paul_Fetch
http://www.rbcdothan.org/  Ridgecrest Baptist Church
http://www.chipola.edu/   Chipola College
http://www.mh.alabama.gov/